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Abstract
We combine Hotelling’s model of product differentiation with tie-in
sales. Tie-in sales condition the sale of one good upon the purchase of
another good. In equilibrium firms choose zero product differentiation.
Due to the tying structure no firm can gain the whole market by a
small price reduction. Then we address the following questions: Can
a firm with monopoly power in one market leverage this power into
another market where it faces competition. What is the effect from
tying on the profits of the monopolist’s rival. In our model this effect
is ambiguous.
Keywords: Horizontal product differentiation, tie-in sales, leverage
theory of tying, foreclosure
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1 Introduction
Among others, Hotelling recognized that sales volumes change gradually as
firms change their prices. This observation stands in sharp contrast to the dis-
continuous consumer behavior for a homogeneous good used by Bertrand. To
explain why firm specific demand is continuous in price differences, Hotelling
(1929) introduced a model of horizontal product differentiation. Two firms
offer a good that is identical in all respects except for one characteristic. By
choosing this characteristic firms can differentiate their goods. Consumers
derive different utility from consumption of the goods because their most
preferred characteristic varies. The larger the distance between a consumer’s
preferred and a good’s actual characteristic, the lower her utility for this
good. Transportation costs measure this reduction in utility.
Hotelling assumes linear transportation costs. In equilibrium firms choose
characteristics for their goods as close as possible to each other, a result
known as the principle of minimum differentiation. However, this result is
invalid. D’Aspremont, Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979) showed that no equi-
librium in pure strategies exists if both sellers are close to each other. Close
competitors can gain the entire market by a small price cut. So there is a
discontinuity in the firms’ profit functions as prices change.
We combine Hotelling’s model with tie-in sales. Tie-in sales require con-
sumers to buy a good as a condition for buying another good. Generally,
tie-in sales come in two main forms: fixed or variable proportions. Bundling
refers to goods that are tied together in fixed proportions. Sales with goods
tied in variable proportions leave to the buyer to decide on the respective
quantities1. In our model consumers purchase no more than one unit of the
1Definitions for tie-in sales and bundling vary in the literature. But a survey of defi-
nitions goes beyond the scope of this paper. Here we choose definitions that, hopefully,
helps to understand the terms.
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tied goods. For this reason, a tying firm sells its goods in fixed proportions.
The distinction between variable and fixed proportions disappears. There-
fore, we use tie-in sales, tying and bundling as synonyms.
The classic example for tie-in sales is IBM’s tabulating cards case. IBM
maintained a quasi-monopoly on tabulating machines. To use these machines
the lessees needed punch cards. In the market for punch cards IBM faced
competition. A further example is Cablecom in Switzerland. Cablecom is
the only provider for pay per view television, their so called digital cinema.
To receive the pay per view cinema, consumers must also subscribe for a
television service with fixed program sequence. The market for such a service
is competitive. Cablecom faces competition from the conventional television
program and another provider, Teleclub, with fixed program sequence.
Both examples have in common that the tying firm dominates one market
and faces competition in another market. Two other examples illustrate
this situation. An often-cited example for tie-in sales is Times-Picayune
which published a morning and an evening newspaper. Its sole competitor
in the daily newspaper field was an independent evening paper. Times-
Picayune bundled an advertisement in the morning paper with the advert
in its evening issue. Take Microsoft’s bundling of Media Player into its
operating system as a further example. Microsoft has power in the market
for operating systems whereas it faces competition in the market for digital
players. Such examples motivate the widely used setting of a monopolist in
one market competing with another firm in a second market. In the second
market firms offer homogenous or given differentiated products. We modify
this basic framework by modelling the second market in Hotelling’s way: A
television provider must compile a program out of many categories like, e.g.,
sports and documentaries. Thus, our model endogenizes firms’ differentiation
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choices. The combination of horizontal product differentiation with tie-in
sales results in zero differentiation. In equilibrium, the firms’ competitively
supplied goods are homogeneous. Yet no firm attracts the entire market by
a small price reduction. The tying firm does not serve consumers with low
valuations for the monopoly good. The non-tying firm cannot win the entire
market with a price reduction such that its price is non-negative. Not all of
the tying firm’s consumers give up the monopoly good for a price reduction.
Our model and its outcome are closely related to the work by Carbajo, de
Meza and Seidmann (1990). As is common in the tying literature they assume
the bundling firm being a monopolist in one market and facing competition
from another firm in another market. In the duopoly market the firms’
goods are homogeneous. Firms compete in prices. The main finding is that
imperfect competition creates a strategic incentive for bundling. Bundling
alters the behavior of the monopolist’s rival and reduces competitiveness in
the duopoly market. Specifically, if the monopolist bundles, it no longer sells
to all consumers. It is profitable to serve only consumers with high valuations
for the monopoly good. This in turn causes the monopolist’s rival to act
less aggressively. If the monopolist does not bundle, Bertrand competition
drives prices down to marginal costs. Because bundling itself allows product
differentiation, the bundle and the competitively offered good alone are not
homogeneous. Both firms can raise prices above costs.
Like Carbajo, de Meza and Seidmann, we find that bundling softens com-
petition. This competition softening mechanism is responsible for equilibrium
stability in our combination of Hotelling’s model with tie-in sales. Goods in
the duopoly market are homogeneous. The tying firm’s profit function still
exhibits a discontinuity. But the discontinuity is at a price which is not
profit-maximizing because it is no longer profitable to serve all consumers.
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By contrast, the profit function of the tying firm’s competitor exhibits no
discontinuity. The competitor cannot induce all consumers to give up the
monopoly good for a small price reduction.
The leverage theory of tying is a prominent concern in the literature
about tie-in sales. According to this theory, tying is an instrument to use
monopoly power in one market to gain an advantage or reduce competition
in another market. We examine the leverage hypothesis within our model by
studying the tying effects on competition. This brings us close to Whinston’s
(1990) reexamination of the leverage theory. His setting also consists of a
monopolist in one market who competes in another duopoly market. Unlike
most models, Whinston assumes increasing returns to scale in the production
process. He shows that tying may alter the market structure in the duopoly
market depending on the size of fixed costs. Tying serves as a mechanism to
reduce the sales of the monopolist’s competitor. Such foreclosure may lower
the competitor’s profits below a “level that would justify continued opera-
tion”. The monopolist can transfer its power into the competitive market to
exclude the rival.
We extend our model so that it is in line with Whinston’s setting and
find similar results. We also find the ambiguous effect from tie-in sales on
profits of the tying firm’s competitor. If fixed costs are not too large, fore-
closure does not exclude the tying’s firm competitor. Tie-in sales can even
raise the competitor’s profits. In Whinston’s model the ambiguity depends
on the specification for the monopoly good valuations. But we specify these
valuations. So, there is another reason for the ambiguity. The reason are per
unit distance transportation costs. While Whinston assumes differentiated
products and uses general demand functions, we explicitly model product
differentiation. This different modelling introduces per unit distance trans-
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portation costs that are responsible for the ambiguity. To be more precise,
it is the level of transportation costs that makes the effect ambiguous. If
transportation costs per unit distance are low, the goods in the competitive
market are better substitutes. Thus, competition increases and prices are
low. The monopolist can prevent such fierce competition by tying. Tying
reduces price competition because it induces the monopolist’s rival to price
less aggressively. Reduced competition also benefits the tying firm’s competi-
tor. For low per unit distance transportation costs the competition reducing
effect can even overweigh the foreclosing effect. In this case, the tying firm’s
competitor also benefits from tie-in sales and collects higher profits.
The paper is organized as follows: In section 2 we set up the model.
Next, we derive the demand functions and the equilibrium in section 3. We
extend the model in section 4 to analyze the decision to tie and its effect on
competition. In section 5 we conclude.
2 The Model
Consider two firms 1 and 2 and two markets A and B. Firm 1 is a monopolist
in market A. It offers a non-differentiable good A. By contrast, firm 1
competes with firm 2 in market B. Both firms supply good B that is identical
in all respects except one characteristic. A line with length one describes all
possible values of this characteristic. The firms locate on this unit line. Let
qi, i = 1, 2, denote firm i’s location. We assume that firm 1 cannot locate to
the right of firm 2, i.e., q1 ≤ q2. Unit and fixed costs are zero for both firms
and both goods. We want to show and understand equilibrium existence in
horizontal product differentiation with linear transportation costs and tie-
in sales. Therefore, we focus on pure tying. Firm 1 only offers a bundle
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containing one unit of each good A and B.
There is a continuum of consumers with unit mass. Each consumer de-
mands at most one unit of good A. The consumers have valuations rA for
A. Valuations rA are uniformly distributed on the interval [0, 1]. Each con-
sumer has unit demand for good B. We denote by β a consumer’s address
on the unit line. This address reflects consumer β’s most preferred location
or good characteristic. Let t be transportation costs per unit distance. Then
a consumer incurs linear transportation costs t|q − β| if her address differs
from sales location q. Independently of rA, all consumers have the same gross
valuation rB for B.
Consumers have two options: either they buy from firm 1 a bundle con-
taining both products, or they do not buy good A at all and purchase only
good B from firm 2. Irrespective of consumers’ addresses firm 1 charges the
mill price p1 for the bundle. Likewise, firm 2 sells good B to all consumers
at the same mill price p2. Firms pass on total transportation costs to the
consumers. Thus, consumers pay a generalized price consisting of the mill
price and transportation costs. If a consumer with address β buys the bundle
from firm 1 she has utility
v(β, q1, p1) = rA + rB − t|q1 − β| − p1.
If she only buys good B from firm 2 her utility is
v(β, q2, p2) = rB − t|q2 − β| − p2.
The set-up gives rise to the following two stage game. In the first stage,
the firms simultaneously choose their locations. In the second stage, the
firms simultaneously set prices. We look for a subgame perfect equilibrium
in pure strategies.
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3 The Equilibrium
3.1 Demand Specification
First of all, we need the demand functions to find the game’s equilibrium.
Although we are close to Hotelling’s framework, demand specification in our
model is different from Hotelling. In the standard Hotelling model consumers
base their purchasing decision upon the generalized price. Equating the
generalized prices for the firms’ goods determines the indifferent consumer.
This indifferent consumer has an address in-between the firms’ locations.
Only one consumer is indifferent between buying from 1 or 2. In our model
consumers can be indifferent although they have an address in one of the
firms’ hinterlands. To see why, consider all consumers with β ≤ q1. These
consumers buy firm 1’s bundle if it yields a higher surplus than consuming
only good B:
rA − t(q1 − β) − p1 ≥ −t(q2 − β) − p2.
Rearranging terms, we see that consumers willing to pay more than the
difference between the price difference and the transportation costs difference
travel to firm 1:
rA ≥ (p1 − p2) − t(q2 − q1). (1)
Consumers buy the bundle if their valuations for A satisfy condition 1. But
the valuations differ. Some consumers do not find A attractive enough to
purchase the bundle. Hence, not all consumers to firm 1’s left buy from firm
1. Analogously, some consumers with β > q2 value A high enough that they
buy the bundle.
The criterion given by condition 1 has a further implication. With re-
spect to transportation costs, consumers with β ≤ q1 assess only the distance
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between q1 and q2. For a consumer living to the left of firm 1 transportation
costs from covering the way to q1 accrue anyway, independent of the address.
Suppose the unit line represents broadcast programs. A program at the left
endpoint corresponds to purely sports selection. The opposite right endpoint
stands for documentary themes only. Let the firms be at locations different
than endpoints. Consumers who like sports very much are on the left of
firm 1. These consumers must take a movement in direction documentary,
independently of the television provider. Then, valuation rA is the only vari-
able that affects the buying decision. If the valuation exceeds some critical
value, the consumer buys the bundle. The analogous reasoning holds for all
consumers with β > q2.
To identify the demand functions we divide the unit line into three re-
gions as shown in figure 1. Region X contains consumers with β ≤ q1. All 
D2X D2Y D2Z 
0 1 q1 q2 
1
D1X 
D1Y 
D1Z 
rA 
Region X Region Y Region Z 
Figure 1: Demand Regions
consumers with q1 < β ≤ q2 belong to region Y . In region Z lie all consumers
to the right of firm 2’s location, q2 < β. Firm i serves demand DiR in the
respective regions R = X,Y, Z.
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Demand DiX: In region X consumers’ addresses are irrelevant as ar-
gued above. Concerning transportation costs, only the difference between the
locations weighted by the unit distance costs is important. Hence, all con-
sumers with valuations satisfying condition 1 buy the bundle. The indifferent
consumers are given by the equality
rA = p1 − p2 − t(q2 − q1).
Demand in region X only consists of consumers to firm 1’s left. The demand
functions in region X are:
D1X = q1Prob [rA ≥ p1 − p2 − t(q2 − q1)] = q1 (1 − p1 + p2 + t(q2 − q1)) ,
D2X = q1Prob [rA < p1 − p2B − t(q2 − q1)] = q1 (p1 − p2 − t(q2 − q1)) .
Demand DiZ: As in region X, only the difference between the sales
locations affects the difference in transportation costs. Consumers located in
region Z buy from firm 1 if they find A attractive enough. The valuation for
good A must be at least as high as the sum of the price difference and the
transportation costs difference,
rA ≥ p1 − p2 + t(q2 − q1).
In region Z firms serve the fractions
D1Z = (1 − q2)Prob[rA ≥ p1 − p2 + t(q2 − q1)]
= (1 − q2)(1 − p1 + p2 − t(q2 − q1)),
D2Z = (1 − q2)Prob[rA < p1 − p2 + t(q2 − q1)]
= (1 − q2)(p1 − p2 + t(q2 − q1)).
Demand DiY : Consumers with addresses in region Y base their buying
decision on valuation rA and the generalized prices. All consumers with net
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utilities
rA − t(β − q1) − p1 ≥ −t(q2 − β) − p2
demand the bundle. Solving this decision rule for rA yields the indifferent
consumers’ valuations depending on address, prices and locations:
r̂A(β, p1, p2, q1, q2) = p1 − p2 + t (2β − q1 − q2) .
The function r̂A gives for each address the minimal valuation a consumer
must have that she buys the bundle. Thus, unlike in region X and Z, ad-
dress β affects the buying decision. A consumer who buys the bundle and has
address far away from q1 incurs high transportation costs. Whereas trans-
portation costs are lower when buying from firm 2. The consumer only buys
from 1 if consumption of A compensates for higher transportation costs. As
∂r̂A(β)/∂β > 0 shows, addresses closer to q2 require a higher rA. Summing
up r̂A over region Y results in the fraction of consumers that buy from firm
2. Hence, the demand functions are:
D1Y = q2 − q1 −
∫ q2
q1
r̂A(β)dβ = (1 − p1 + p2)(q2 − q1),
D2Y =
∫ q2
q1
r̂A(β)dβ = (p1 − p2)(q2 − q1)
Figure 2 illustrates the demand for firm 1’s bundle and firm 2’s good. The
shaded area represents all consumers who have β-rA-combinations such that
they buy the bundle. Firm 2 serves demand corresponding to the non-shaded
area.
Finally, we can state total demand for the bundle and for 2’s good B.
Total demand D1 for the bundle consists in the sum of the respective fractions
in each region R. Similarly, summing up each region demand for B gives total
10
 
rA 
1 
q1 q2 
D1Y 
D2Y 
)qqt(2βppr 2121A −−+−=
)
β 
Figure 2: Demand in Region Y
demand D2.
D1 = D1X + D1Y + D1Z = 1 − p1 + p2 − t(q2 − q1)(1 − q1 − q2),
D2 = D2X + D2Y + D2Z = p1 − p2 + t(q2 − q1)(1 − q1 − q2),
3.2 The Firms’ Behavior
In the second stage firms set prices given locations and the opponent’s price.
The firms’ maximize profits
π1 = p1D1 = p1 [1 − p1 + p2 − t(q2 − q1)(1 − q1 − q2)] ,
π2 = p2D2 = p2 [p1 − p2 + t(q2 − q1)(1 − q1 − q2)] ,
with respect to their prices. Maximizing and solving firms’ profits with re-
spect to prices gives the firms’ reaction functions:
p1(p2) = (1 + p2 − t(q2 − q1)(1 − q1 − q2)) /2,
p2(p1) = (p1 + t(q2 − q1)(1 − q1 − q2)) /2.
Both price reaction functions are linear in the other firm’s price and positively
sloped. It follows that the reaction functions are well-behaved in the sense
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that they intersect only once. The intersection determines best response
prices for the second stage at given locations. We can solve the system of
equations given by the reaction functions for p1 and p2. This yields optimal
prices for the second stage as functions of locations:
p∗
1
(q1, q2) = (2 − t(q2 − q1)(1 − q1 − q2)) /3
and
p∗
2
(q1, q2) = (1 + t(q2 − q1)(1 − q1 − q2)) /3.
Next, we turn to the first stage. Firms choose their profit-maximizing
locations. Given their optimal pricing behavior, firms maximize profits
π1 = [2 − t(q2 − q1) (1 − q1 − q2)]
2 /9
and
π2 = [1 + t(q2 − q1)(1 − q1 − q2)]
2 /9
with respect to their locations. The firms’ F.O.Cs. are
∂π1/∂q1 = 2t (2 − t(q2 − q1)(1 − q1 − q2)) (1 − 2q1)/9 = 0
and
∂π2/∂q2 = 2t (1 + t(q2 − q1)(1 − q1 − q2)) (1 − 2q2)/9 = 0.
Before solving for the optimal locations, note that outer derivatives resemble
the price functions. Using the price functions we rewrite the F.O.Cs. in a
more concise way :
∂π1/∂q1 = 2tp
∗
1
(q1, q2)(1 − 2q1)/3 = 0
and
∂π2/∂q2 = 2tp
∗
2
(q1, q2)(1 − 2q2)/3 = 0.
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Then, we see that firms locate at 1/2. Otherwise, the firms choose locations
such that profits are zero because prices are zero. If prices equal zero, firms
are not profit-maximizing. The following proposition 1 summarizes the firms’
equilibrium behavior.
Proposition 1 In the Hotelling game with tie-in sales firms set equilibrium
prices p∗
1
= 2/3 and p∗
2
= 1/3. Both firms locate at q = 1/2. Equilibrium
profits are π∗
1
= 4/9 and π∗
2
= 1/9.
In Hotelling’s original model firms choose minimal differentiation. If prod-
uct differentiation is minimal a small price reduction attracts all consumers.
Therefore, the firms undercut each other. This effect does not occur in our
model. No firm lowers its price although they choose the same location. To
get the entire market firm 1 needs to lower its price below firm 2’s price.
Firm 1’s profits when serving all consumers are π1 = p2 − t(q2 − q1) − ǫ. If
both firms locate at 1/2, firm 1 earns no more than 1/9 < π∗
1
. Hence, firm 1
does not change its price given its opponent’s price.
If firm 2 wants to attract all consumers by a price reduction, it must
compensate consumers for passing on good A. In the Cablecom example
consumers switch to Teleclub only if the lower price compensates for giving
up digital cinema. Unlike in Hotelling’s standard model firm 2 does not win
all consumers if it lowers its price by a small amount ǫ. Consumers with high
valuations value digital cinema more than the price reduction. Because firms
choose the same locations, their good B is homogenous. Then consumers
prefer firm 2’s good over the bundle if rA − p1 ≤ −p2. In equilibrium, the
indifferent consumer has the valuation r̂A = 1/3. If firm 2 lowers its price by
ǫ the equation rA = p
∗
1
− p∗
2
+ ǫ identifies the new indifferent consumer. We
see that firm 2’s price reduction by ǫ increases demand for its good to the
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same extent. In this case firm 2 earns profits (1/3 + ǫ)(p∗
2
− ǫ) < π∗
2
. Hence,
firm 2 does not change its price given firm 1’s price.
Proposition 1 shows that firms choose zero differentiation. This result
corresponds to the homogeneity assumption in Carbajo, de Meza and Sei-
dmann. They analyze a model with the same basic structure: Firm 1 is a
monopolist in market A and faces competition by firm 2 in market B. The
main finding is a strategic motivation for bundling. Firm 1 may bundle be-
cause it softens competition. By bundling firm 1 restricts itself. It only sells
to consumers with high valuations for A. Thus, firm 2 sets a price above
marginal costs. Both firms earn positive profits on the homogeneous good.
Tying reduces competition that otherwise prevails in the duopoly market be-
cause it differentiates firms’ products. This differentiation resembles vertical
product differentiation. Thereby, the monopolistic good serves as surrogate
for, e.g., quality. The same competition softening effect is responsible for
equilibrium stability in our model. Because consumers have different val-
uations for A, or quality, firm 2 cannot attract its rival’s consumers by a
small price reduction. Firm 1 only serves consumers with high valuation for
A. The discontinuity of firm 1’s profit function is at a price which does not
maximize profits. Because firm 2 cannot induce all consumers to buy only
good B its profit function does not exhibit a discontinuity here.
4 Firm 1’s Tying Decision and its Effect on
Competition
To analyze firm 1’s decision to tie its goods we extend our game to four
stages. This extension also provides insights about the effects from tying on
competition. We refer to this new game as the “decision game”. Let us stick
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to the same setting as proposed in section 2. In addition we assume that
supplying good B involves fixed costs K. Fixed costs are such that both
firms are active in market B whenever firm 1 does not bundle2. The (new)
sequence of events is as follows:
• Stage 1: Firm 1 once and for all chooses to offer its goods in a bundle
or separately.
• Stage 2: Firm 2 once and for all decides whether to be active in market
B or not.
• Stage 3: Active firms choose their locations.
• Stage 4: Firms simultaneously set prices.
We depict the timing for the decision game in figure 3.
 
1st Stage 2nd Stage 3rd and 4th Stage 
π1M q1 
Firm 1 
Firm 2 
No 
tie-in 
Tie-in 
Not 
active 
Active q1 q2 p1 p2 
p1 
π1* 
π2* 
Both firms 
are active 
p1A p1B p2 
π1NT 
π2NT 
q1 q2 
Figure 3: Timing of the Decision Game
If firm 1 does not bundle, market B is Hotelling’s original model. In fact,
no equilibrium in pure strategies exists. The most accurate way to handle
2We restrict attention to both firms being active in market B in the case without tying
because we want to analyze the tying’s effect on competition.
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non-existence of equilibrium in pure strategies is calculating the (a) mixed
strategy equilibrium. To the best of our knowledge, Osborne and Pitchik
(1987) are the only ones who appeal to mixed strategies to solve Hotelling’s
original model. Osborne and Pitchik derive useful properties of the equilib-
rium strategies. Due to the complexity of the problem, however, they are
not able to solve the game analytically and cannot specify equilibrium pay-
offs. But analytical specifications for firms’ payoffs are necessary to solve
our decision game. Thus, we use another way-out and limit our analysis to
pure strategies. To obtain a pure strategy equilibrium we restrict the strat-
egy spaces for firms’ locations3. Firm 1 can only locate in the first and firm
2 in the fourth quartile, i.e., q1 ∈ [0, 1/4] and q2 ∈ [3/4, 1]. The restric-
tion ensures that firms cannot locate closer to each other than one half. As
shown by d’Aspremont, Gabszewicz and Thisse, one half is the minimally
required distance between the firms such that a pure strategy equilibrium
exists. Adherence to this required distance does not affect the subgame with
firm 1 bundling. For this subgame, we show later that the restriction of the
strategy spaces does not affect firms’ equilibrium prices and profits.
Note that firm 1 is always active in market B. If firm 1 bundles it always
offers good B. If firm 1 does not bundle, the above assumption for K ensures
that both firms supply B. So, we can study if tying can be an instrument to
foreclose sales in, and thereby monopolize, a competitive market.
Again, we use subgame perfect Nash as equilibrium concept. To solve the
decision game we need firms’ behavior in the three subgames: Firm 1 does
not bundle, firm 1 bundles but firm 2 is inactive and firm 1 bundles but firm
2 is active. All three subgames consist of the third and fourth stage of the
decision game. We devote the next three subsections to identify equilibrium
3This approach is not new. See, e.g., Economides (1984, 1986), Hinloopen and Mar-
rewijk (1999) or Posada and Strauma (2004)
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outcomes in the location-then-price subgames.
The Subgame without Tie-in Sales
If firm 1 does not condition the purchase of good A on purchasing good B,
the two markets are unrelated. Because the markets are not related and both
firms are active, market B corresponds to Hotelling’s model. The outcome
in the price setting stage for Hotelling’s two stage game does not change in
our model. We can adopt his results for the fourth stage. In the fourth stage
firms set prices p1B = t(2 + q1 + q2)/3 and p2 = t(4 − q1 − q2)/3 given the
locations.
In the third stage the strategic variable for each firm is its location. Given
the pricing behavior firms solve the maximization problems
max
q1
π1B(q1) = t(2 + q1 + q2)
2/18 − K,
max
q2
π2(q2) = t(4 − q1 − q2)
2/18 − K.
The derivative of profits shows that firms increase their profits by moving
toward each other, ∂π1B/∂q1 > 0 and ∂π2/∂q2 < 0. Firms locate as close
as possible to each other as strategy spaces allow, as expected due to the
principle of minimum differentiation. With minimally possible differentiation
firms set the same price t for good B. At same prices both firms serve half
the market. In the subgame without tying the firms earn the same profits
πNT
1B = π
NT
2
= t/2 − K in market B.
Firm 1 is monopolist in market A. In this market consumers have different
valuations for one unit of good A. Altogether, they form a downward sloping
demand function for A given by DA(pA) = Prob[rA ≥ pA] = 1 − pA. Firm 1
maximizes its profits by charging pNTA = 1/2 and earns profits π
NT
A = 1/4 on
good A.
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Lemma 1 In the subgame without tie-in sales firm 1 sets the price pNTA =
1/2 in market A. Both firms set the same prices pNT
1B = p
NT
2
= t in market
B. Firm 1 locates at q1 = 1/4 and firm 2 at q2 = 3/4 in market B. Overall
profits are πNT
1
= (1 + 2t)/4 − K and πNT
2
= t/2 − K.
Remember that fixed costs are such that both firms sell B in case of no
tying. Because firm 2 has the lowest profits, πNT
2
≥ 0 determines a lower
bound for t. By this condition, per unit distance transportation costs have
to be no smaller than twice the fixed costs, i.e., t ≥ 2K.
The Subgame with Inactive Firm 2 and Tie-in Sales
Firm 1 is a monopolist for both goods A and B if firm 2 is inactive. Then,
firm 1 earns monopoly profits πM
1
. We do not calculate these monopoly
profits. All we need to know is that monopoly profits are higher than profits
whenever firm 2 is active. For concreteness, consider the following intuitive
argument. Firm 1 is monopolist and uses tie-in sales. Consumers can only
buy the bundle. Certainly, firm 1 sets a monopoly price higher than prices
when it faces competition by firm 2. But suppose instead that firm 1 has
two choices for the price. Either it sells the bundle at a price equal to p∗
1
,
the bundle price if firm 2 is active. Or, it charges a price corresponding to
the sum of prices for A and B without tying. If firm 1 chooses between these
two possibilities it picks the price that yields higher profits. Independently
of the price, demand is higher than under competition. Because demand
is higher firm 1’s profits increase, even if it sells at competition prices. By
monopolizing market B firm 1 earns higher profits than under competition.
The Subgame with Active Firm 2 and Tie-in Sales
The third subgame is the game studied in section 3. However, we must
reanalyze the firms’ behavior because we restrict the sets of locations. Firms’
behavior in the price setting stage remains unchanged. We can pick up the
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reexamination in the location stage. It is the third stage in the decision game.
For the purpose of exposition, we restate the derivatives of firms’ profits with
respect to locations:
∂π1/∂q1 = 2tp
∗
1
(q1, q2)(1 − 2q1)/3,
∂π2/∂q2 = 2tp
∗
2
(q1, q2)(1 − 2q2)/3.
We see that ∂π1/∂q1 > 0 and ∂π2/∂q2 < 0 for non-negative prices. Again,
firms locate as close as possible to each other. We have established:
Lemma 2 In the Hotelling game with tie-in sales and restricted strategy
space for locations firms set equilibrium prices p∗
1
= 2/3 and p∗
2
= 1/3.
Firm 1 locates at q∗
1
= 1/4 and firm 2 at q∗
2
= 3/4. Equilibrium profits are
π∗
1
= 4/9 − K and π∗
2
= 1/9 − K.
Now, let us analyze the second stage of the decision game. In this stage
firm 2 decides whether to be active in market B. According to our assumption
for K firm 2 is always active if firm 1 does not bundle. This is not true
whenever firm 1 bundles. If firm 1 bundles firm 2 is active in market B as
long as π∗
2
= 1/9 − K ≥ 0. Thus, firm 2 is active for K ≤ 1/9. If K > 1/9
firm 2’s overall profits are negative. Firm 2 does not serve enough consumers
to cover its fixed costs at the profit-maximizing price. Scale economies are
too small and consequently firm 2 remains inactive.
Given firm 2’s behavior in the second stage we turn to the first stage. In
the first stage firm 1 decides about using tie-in sales or not. The decision
whether to tie depends on profits under tying and no tying. For K ≤ 1/9,
that is firm 2 is active, firm 1 engages in bundling if
π∗
1
= 4/9 − K ≥ (1 + 2t)/4 − K = πNT
1
.
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So, firm 1 uses tie-in sales for t small enough, i.e., t ≤ 7/18. If t > 7/18 firm
1 does not bundle. In case K exceeds 1/9 firm 2 is inactive if firm 1 offers
the bundle. Then, firm 1 always ties its goods because it can monopolize the
market B. As a tying monopolist in both markets firm 1’s profits are always
higher than without tying. We summarize the firms’ behavior in the decision
game by proposition 2 and represent it in figure 4.
Proposition 2 In the decision game, firm 1 bundles
· if K ≤ 1/9 (i.e., firm 2 is active) and transportation costs per unit
distance are small enough (i.e., t ≤ 7/18). The firms set prices and earn
profits given by lemma 2.
· if K > 1/9 (i.e., firm 2 is inactive). Firm 1 earns monopoly profits πM
1
.
Otherwise, firm 1 does not bundle and the firms’ prices and profits are
given by lemma 1.
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Figure 4: Firm 1’s Tying Decision
Our analysis shows that tying forecloses firm 2’s sales. In the no tying case
firm 2 serves half the market whereas one third in case of tying. This sales
foreclosure can make operation for firm 2 unprofitable. Here, firm 2 does not
operate for K > 1/9. By excluding firm 2, firm 1 alters structure in the tied
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good market. Firm 1 forecloses enough sales to keep its rival inactive and
thereby monopolizes the originally competitive market. For sufficiently large
fixed costs tie-in sales are indeed an instrument to eliminate competition.
But as proposition 2 shows, firm 1 cannot always exclude its competitor
from the market. If fixed costs are small, i.e., K ≤ 1/9, firm 2 is active.
However, tying can still be optimal for firm 1. This is true for t ≤ 7/18. As
lemma 1 shows, non-bundling prices are lower in the competitive market the
lower t is. A decreasing t increases substitutability between goods because
transportation costs are lower. Higher substitutability intensifies price com-
petition. Firm 1 circumvents such intense competition by using tie-in sales.
Its demand increases and prices become independent of t.
Tying always lowers firm 2’s sales. This sales foreclosure leads to firm 2’s
exclusion if K is large enough. However, for small K, the foreclosure effect is
not strong enough to keep firm 2 inactive. In this case the effect from tying
on firm 2’s profits is ambiguous and depends on t. Tying reduces intense
price competition that occurs if t is small. If t ≤ 2/9 tie-in sales entail higher
profits for firm 2 compared to a non-tying regime:
π∗
2
= 1/9 − K ≥ t/2 − K = πNT
2
for t ≤ 2/9.
Figure 4 depicts these per unit transportation costs by the upper triangle
at the origin. For all other t firm 2’s profits decrease whenever firm 1 ties.
Thus, for t being small, firm 2 also profits from bundling although demand
for its good is lower. The higher price under bundling can overcompensate
the lower demand.
To get our ideas across we provide an example. Consider a situation with
t = 1/5 and K = 1/20. Note that these parameter values are consistent
with t ≥ 2K. Because t = 1/5 < 7/18 firm 1 engages in tying. The bundle
sells at a price 2/3. If firm 1 sells the goods individually the sum of prices is
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1/5 + 1/4 = 9/20 < 2/3. Tying allows firm 1 to charge a higher price than
untied selling. But firm 2 also profits from tying via reduced competition.
Without tying firm 2 sets a price 1/5 and has profits 1/20. Under tying firm
2’s price is 1/3 > 1/5 and profits amount to 11/180 > 1/20.
The result that tying need not always result in excluding firm 2 or lower-
ing its profits is consistent with Whinston’s findings. He names two distinct
reasons why commitment to tying may fail to lower firm 2’s profits. First,
good A may be unattractive. In Whinston’s model tying creates an incen-
tive to price more aggressively. The less attractive consumers find A the
more aggressively prices a bundling firm. With aggressive bundle prices the
margin between bundle price and unit costs is rather low. In this case firm
1’s monopoly in market A is too weak for bundling to be an exclusionary
threat. Because enough consumers find good A unattractive bundling rather
helps than hurts the tying firm’s rival. But unit costs and distribution for
consumers’ valuations for A do not vary in our model. Therefore, Whinston’s
first reason is not the cause for ambiguous effects from tying on firm 2’s prof-
its. The second reason is similar to the mechanism described in section 3 that
leads to a stable equilibrium. Bundling transforms the homogeneous market
into a setting comparable to vertical differentiation. Clearly, consumers value
the bundle more than good B alone. With heterogeneous valuations for A
consumers differ in their valuation for the bundle. According to Whinston,
effects from bundling on firm 2’s profits depend on how large this valuation
difference is. We assume a specific distribution for rA. Hence, the extent by
which consumers’ valuation differ is fixed. Therefore, magnitude of differ-
ences in consumers’ valuation is not the reason for the ambiguity.
In our model, we find another reason for the ambiguous effect from tying
on firm 2’s profits. As shown above it is the level of per unit distance trans-
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portation costs t. Whinston assumes given differentiated products and uses
general demand functions in the duopoly market. By contrast, we set it up
in Hotelling’s spirit. In this way, transportation rate enters the model. As
long as firm 2 is active it can also profit from tying depending on t.
5 Conclusions
In his model of horizontal product differentiation Hotelling uses linear trans-
portation costs. With linear transportation costs firms choose locations as
close as possible to each other. But an equilibrium in pure strategies fails
to exist. The reason is firms’ proximity and the resulting undercutting. As
d’Aspremont, Gabszewicz and Thisse show, firms must locate far enough
from each other. Otherwise, firms have an incentive to attract consumers
in the competitor’s hinterland. If firms are not far enough, they gain the
whole market by a small price reduction. This effect leads to non-existence
of equilibrium in Hotelling’s model.
In this paper we combine horizontal differentiation with tie-in sales. We
adopt a widely used setting: Firm 1 is a monopolist in some market A and
faces competition by firm 2 in another market B. In our model firms still
choose as little product differentiation as possible, namely zero differenti-
ation. But neither the bundling firm nor its competitor undercuts. The
bundling firm does not undercut because it is no longer profitable to serve all
consumers. Consumers have different valuations for the monopoly good. It
turns out that the bundling firm only serves consumers with high valuations.
Similarly, the bundling firm’s competitor does not serve all consumers too.
Because valuations for the monopoly good differ, the tying firm’s competitor
cannot gain the whole demand by a small price reduction. Attracting the
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whole market means for both firms decreasing profits. Thus, the incentive
to undercut does not exist.
We extend our model to analyze the effects from tying on competition.
In particular, we address the question if tying can alter the market structure.
For this purpose we assume that entering the duopoly market involves fixed
costs. In fact, the monopolist always forecloses its rival’s sales by tying.
But offering a bundle need not always be profitable for firm 1 compared
to selling the goods independently. The profitability depends on per unit
distance transportation costs and the possibility to exclude firm 2 from the
market. Depending on fixed costs the foreclosure may be high enough that
remaining in the market is unprofitable for the monopolist’s rival. Complete
elimination of competition is possible for large enough fixed costs. However,
if fixed costs are not large enough, firm 2 remains active. Moreover, bundling
may even increase firm 2’s profits if per unit distance transportation costs
are small enough.
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